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Catholic University Law Review
Law Students: Unconstitutional Bar Admission
Procedures
In the recent decision of Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wad-
mond,1 a panel of three judges2 of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York struck down as unconstitutional several questions in question-
naires distributed by the Appellate Division and the Committee on Character and Fit-
ness 3 to determine the fitness of applicants for membership in the state bar. Before a
prospective lawyer can validly practice in New York state courts, he must prove not
only his familiarity with state law and procedure, but also his "character and general
fitness."4 This second criterion has long been part of the admission process for member-
ship in the bars of this country.5 Although the total concept of proving fitness was put
in question in the Law Students case, the action of the court was directed not so much
at the requirement itself, but the way in which New York has administered inquiries
under it. The court decided that present methods violate an applicant's rights of free
speech and association protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.
Although none of the plaintiffs6 have been denied admission to the bar, they sought
injunctive and declaratory relief, 7 to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1871.8 Both
were class actions in that they were maintained on behalf of all persons, "seeking or
planning to seek such admission." 9
Circuit Judge Friendly, writing for the majority, agreed that several of the questions
objected to suffered from serious constitutional infirmities and would have to be
changed or excluded. He ruled that the defendants had 90 days to correct the difficul-
ties found by the court and report what actions have been taken, with leave for the
1. Civil No. 68-2917 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 1969).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1964). Section 2281, which provides for injunctive relief
to prevent enforcement of a state statute, requires a three-judge court when a statute is
challenged as unconstiutional on its face or in application. See Evergreen Review, Inc. v.
Cahn, 230 F. Supp. 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). Section 2284 sets out the composition and
procedure of such a panel.
3. "The appellate division in each judicial department shall appoint a committee ...
for the purpose of investigating the character and fitness of every applicant for admis-
sion to practice as an attorney and counselor at law in the courts of this state." N.Y.
Civ. PRAC. R. 9401 (McKinney 1963).
4. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(1) (a) (McKinney 1968).
5. For a detailed discussion of various state provisions, see 45 N.C.L. REv. 1008
(1967).
6. Plaintiffs in the combined suits were the Law Students Civil Rights Research
Council, Inc., "an organization of some 1500 law students with chapters at sixty law
schools" and also three law students who had passed the New York bar examination
and planned to apply for admission when eligible. Defendants are the various appellate
divisions and their justices and the Committees on Character and Fitness for the First
and Second Judicial Departments and their members. Law Students Civil Rights Re-
search Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, Civil No. 68-2917 at 2 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 1969).
7. Ibid. The relief was sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
9. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, Civil No. 68-2917
at 2 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 1969).
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plaintiffs to seek further relief if not satisfied that the court's order had been followed.
In a lengthy separate opinion Judge Motley called for more sweeping changes in the
system itself and objected to the majority position that the statute requiring applicants
to prove their fitness is constitutional. 10
This discussion will be directed to limitations on state bars' implementing statutes
requiring a determination of an applicant's fitness for admission. 11
The New York Statutes
The court in Law Students first dealt with two New York statutes12 which together set
up and implement the requirement that every applicant possess the "character and
general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law." 13 The court sustained
the validity of the requirement statute relying on Konigsberg v. State Bar.14 In that
case the Supreme Court upheld a similar California statute, recognizing that there is a
valid state interest in maintaining high standards for its judicial system. This recogni-
tion, however, was only a general affirmation of state concern and said nothing specifi-
cally about statutory schemes similar to the one in New York. Although Konigsberg
clearly establishes the constitutionality of provisions like Section 90, the New York
court was still faced with the complaint that the implementation statute [Rule 9406]
was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. The alternatives open to the
court, assuming some relief was to be granted, were either to strike Rule 9406 as un-
constitutional as written or seek through other methods to change the application of
the Rule, bringing it within constitutional bounds.
Under Rule 9406 no person can be admitted to practice unless he furnishes the bar
satisfactory proof of his loyalty to the United States government. The plaintiffs, rely-
ing on Speiser v. Randall,15 claimed that such a burden was an unconstitutional abridg-
ment of free speech and association. In Speiser, a veteran was denied a special tax
exemption because he refused to sign a loyalty oath. The statute involved put the bur-
den of proof upon the applicant to demonstrate his loyalty before the exemption
would be granted. The Supreme Court held the requirement invalid because denial of
the exemption solely on the grounds of not signing the oath would be an unconstitu-
10. See dissent, Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond,
Civil No. 68-2917 at 3-4 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 1969).
11. Much has been written on admission to the bar, see, e.g., Jackson, Character
Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 305 (1951) ; Rosenberg,
Constitutional Limitations on the Process of Admission to the Bar, 23 N.Y.U.I.L. REV.
135 (1968). The question of loyalty as a prerequisite to bar admission became a major
consideration especially during the last decade in light of the preoccupation in this
country with tests of loyalty as related to the general fear of Communism. See
Brown & Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 480
(1953).
12. N. Y. JUDIcinAY LAW § 90(1) (a) (McKinney 1963); N.Y. Civ. Pa.c. R. 9406
(McKinney 1963).
13. N.Y. JUDIMARY LAW § 90(1) (a) (McKinney 1968).
14. 366 U.S. 36, 40-44 (1961).
15. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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tional limitation on the freedom of expression guaranteed by the first amendment. The
Court based its decision on the fact that the concept of loyalty was not settled even
within the courts and the burden of proving such a fact would have a deterrent effect
on prospective applicants. The Speiser opinion, however, allowed for an exception in
those cases where only a limited class is involved and where there are present serious
dangers to public safety.' 6 The New York court disagreed with the plaintiffs that the
Supreme Court holding was controlling and distinguished the case from the facts at
bar. In order to justify the burden of proof requirement of the New York Rule, the
court fit the Law Students problem within the exception left in Speiser. In so doing,
the court in part used a rationale culled from language used in Konigsberg to the ef-
fect that it would be appropriate in bar admission cases to apply a balancing test
which would weigh an applicant's right to free association against the state's interest
in assuring itself that lawyers practicing before its courts are loyal beyond suspicion.
The strength of the language, however, is questionable in light of the fact that Mr.
Justice Harlan, who wrote the opinion, noted specifically that the applicant's burden
of proving good moral character was not in issue as the case was presented. 17 In fact,
the holding in Konigsberg was based on the fact that Konigsberg had been forewarned
that if he did not cooperate with the California committee he would be denied admis-
sion for obstructing a valid inquiry. The New York court thus strains the Konigsberg
decision to support its holding that Rule 9406 fits into the Speiser exception.
The court did not rely solely upon the exception in the Speiser decision, but found
additional grounds for its holding in "the lack of 'unequivocal indication' that it [Rule
9406] imposes a true burden of proof as distinguished from a burden of coming for-
ward with evidence."18 Again the court cites Justice Harlan's dicta to support a pre-
carious position. If an applicant were required only to make a statement that he is
loyal to his government to satisfy this burden then this argument would be more ac-
ceptable. However, as Judge Motley pointed out, the applicant's answers to written
questions may be investigated further by the committee, thus continuing the burden of
proof upon him throughout the entire admission process.1 9 Clearly then, there is more
than a mere burden of coming forward with evidence.
The plaintiffs also argued that Rule 9406 was unconstitutionally vague in that no-
where in the statutes or decisions of New York is there a clearly ascertainable defini-
tion of "good moral character. '20 The court held that the Rule was constitutional
16. Id. at 527. See also Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951);
Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
17. 366 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1961).
18. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, Civil No. 68-
2917 at 11 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 1969).
19. Id. at I (dissent).
20. See, e.g., In re Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1944), aff'd on
rehearing, 296 N.Y. 926, 72 N.E.2d 41, 63 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1947); In re Bren-
nan, 230 App. Div. 218, 227, 243 N.Y.S. 705, 715 (1930) ; In re Peters, 221 App. Div.
607, 225 N.Y.S. 144 (1927), aft'd, 250 N.Y. 595, 166 N.E. 337 (1929). See text accom-
panying notes 42-50.
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provided that it was implemented in accordance with its purpose as construed by the
defendants. The defendants interpreted the statute so that "it requires a law officer-to-
be to affirm that he believes in and is loyal to our constitutional form of government" 21
only.
The majority in the Law Students case refused to strike down the New York statute
but rather chose to police its use. Beyond the reasons given by the court, there would
seem to be more basic policy considerations why it chose the course that it did. If it
had struck Rule 9406 the result would have been to leave the bar helpless to effec-
tively administer Section 90 which the court had specifically upheld. If an applicant is
not required to supply proof of his fitness to the bar, how is any proof to be acquired?
Large scale investigations such as those the FBI and other federal agencies conduct to
screen their applicants would be too time consuming and costly for state bars. The
number of applicants seeking bar admission is increasing each year. The need for
expeditious processing is likewise increasing because of pressure from the legal profes-
sion for more licensed practicioners to handle present levels of business.22 Thus, retain-
ing the statutes and controlling the methods used to implement them is, at least, sup-
ported by the practicalities of the situation.
Procedural Limits
The Supreme Court in Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness23 held that
admission proceedings present issues which are justiciable 24 and that findings made by
investigating committees are more than mere advisory opinions. 25 In Willner the peti-
tioner had passed the New York bar examination some 30 years before but had been
denied certification because of charges which were filed against him with the com-
mittee. These charges were never revealed to him. On appeal to the Court of Appeals
he was refused, without opinion, a statement of the reasons why he had been denied
certification. 26 On hearing in the Supreme Court, the committee contended that Will-
ner was rejected solely on the basis of his own statements. The record revealed several
complaints filed against him by members of the bar charging him with fraud in con-
nection with accounting services performed for a client as a registered CPA. The
21. Brief for Defendant at 16, Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc.
v. Wadmond, Civil No. 68-2917 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 1969).
22. TIME, April 18, 1969, at 77, col. 1.: "[G]rowing numbers of the nation's bright-
est law students are ignoring ... generous offers [asmuch as $15,000 to start] and
instead are choosing to teach, clerk for a judge, take a fellowship for further study,
or work in a poverty program. ...
To revive interest, some firms have been forced to provide more outlets for the
idealism of the young. . . .Many [w]ell-established Manhattan firms, cooperate in pro-
grams whereby their junior staff members work one night a week at Legal Aid Society
offices in ghetto neighborhoods."
23. 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
24. Id. at 102.
25. Id. at 104.
26. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 11 N.Y.2d 866, 182 N.E.2d
288 (1962).
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Court held that since the record failed to show that these complaints were not con-
sidered in rejecting him, he was constitutionally entitled to notice of the charges and a
full hearing on the issue.2 7
In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg, recognizing the concern of the com-
mittee to keep its investigations informal and private to facilitate its process, con-
cluded that procedural safeguards are important in admission proceedings and should
be protected by whatever procedures are required.28 Thus the ordinary procedural safe-
guards guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in trial type
situations must be afforded bar applicants. It is generally accepted that the Willner
case has given procedural rights in admission proceedings 29 including notice of the
charges against the applicant and a full hearing on the issues raised, with the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers.
Although these procedural rights have been guaranteed by Willner, there remains
a question whether an applicant can refuse to comply by claiming the fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination. The Court in Cohen v. Hurley3o held that a law-
yer's refusal to answer questions asked of him by a special committee of the bar was
sufficient grounds for disbarment, even though he had claimed a fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination. The Court reasoned that the petitioner's refusal to
answer relevant questions concerning professional conduct was a failure to discharge
obligations, which, as a lawyer, he owed to the court. 31 By way of dicta, the Court
indicated that the difference between admission and disbarment proceedings was "not
of constitutional moment" 32 when considering fifth amendment rights, the inference
being that the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination is inapplicable in
admission proceedings.
The Court later overruled Cohen in Spevack v. Klein.33 Its reasoning was based in
part on its decision in Malloy v. Hogan34 in which it was held that the fifth amend-
ment applies in full force against the states through the fourteenth amendment. The
Spevack case held that disbarment under circumstances similar to Cohen was an
unconstitutional penalty for invoking one's fifth amendment right. The Court did not,
however, address itself to the situation in which an applicant seeks admission to the
bar. In a concurring opinion, Justice Fortas asserted that the right against self-incrimi-
nation may not be recognized in every case where a person's right to practice his pro-
fession is put in jeopardy. 35 The holding in Spevack did not itself secure the fifth
amendment right to bar applicants. Language in the opinion gives the impression that
there was an unwillingness on the part of the Court to extend its holding beyond the
disbarment situation.
The court in Law Students, refusing to lift the burden of proving loyalty from the
applicant-a procedural consideration, underscores judicial unwillingness to provide
27. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 106 (1963).
28. Id. at 107-08.
29. See Sprecher, Due Process Generally in Bar Admissions, 35 BAR EXAM. 34 (1966).
30. 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
31. Id. at 125.
32. Id. at 123.
33. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
34. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
35. 385 U.S. 511, 519 (1967).
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every procedural right which is granted in criminal cases. It can only be concluded,
therefore, that the self-incrimination issue is still an open question in bar admission
proceedings.
Substantive Limits
The Constitution provides protection in many ways for those who wish to practice law
in this country. Although the Law Students case is primarily concerned with the first
amendment protections of free speech and association, there are other considerations
which limit what states may do in controlling admission to the bar. After the Civil
War, Congress passed a law which, in effect, made anyone who had supported the
South ineligible to practice law in the federal courts.3 6 The Supreme Court, in Ex parte
Garland,3 7 ruled that such a law was both a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law
and therefore unconstitutional. An applicant may not be excluded on the basis of past
acts alone,38 nor can he be excluded for acts which when done were not illegal.3 9 While
Garland drew a line beyond which no state could go, it by no means made admission
to practice an absolute right.40
There are, however, important social interests which can be protected only by re-
quiring high standards for lawyers. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners4 1 the Court
made it clear that a state may exclude anyone from practicing law so long as there is a
rational connection between the objectionable conduct and the legitimate state inter-
est sought to be protected. 42 This raises the preliminary question of whether the prac-
tice of law is a right or a privilege. 43 Justice Cardozo, when sitting on the bench in
New York, characterized membership in the bar as a "privilege burdened with condi-
tions." 44 While the notion of necessary conditions may be valid, later courts have pre-
ferred to categorize membership in the bar as a right, emphasizing that it is not a
matter of "grace and favor" 45 with the courts. Whatever can be gleaned from the cases
in the form of definitions of the proper standard for judging fitness for admission is of
little help in understanding what real limitations have been enforced against the bar in
the way it controls admissions. A brief survey of those applicant situations which have
been approved as well as those which have been disapproved will illustrate the con-
fusion which exists.
Although there are scattered among the states various criteria for admission to the
bar,46 it is clear that the final determination as to who will be admitted is the proper
function of the courts. 47 It has been held, under statutes requiring a recommendation
36. Act of July 2, 1862, 12 Stat. 502, as amended, Act of Jan. 24, 1865, 13 Stat.
424.
37. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
38. Id. at 377.
39. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 244 (1957).
40. See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
41. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
42. Id. at 239.
43. See Booker, The "Right" to Practice Law, 1 DUKE B.J. 249 (1951).
44. In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917).
45. In re Kellar, 81 Nev. 240, 242, 401 P.2d 616, 617 (1965).
46. MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, §§ 1-8 (1968); ARIZ. SuP. CT. R. 28(a) (1956).
47. See, e.g., Heibergher v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 169 A.2d 652 (1961).
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from the character committee as a condition to admission, that an appellate court can
review de novo all the evidence even though the committee has acted pursuant to
legislation and had rational grounds for its decision.48
Analysis of what has been decided in admission cases reveals a standard of conduct-
belief which courts have used to determine when to look beyond recommendations of
character committees. By this standard, unfavorable beliefs cannot be used as a reason
for denying admission unless some kind of conduct-or lack of conduct-can be found.
Once some form of conduct is shown, the only limiting factor is the "rational connec-
tion" test of Schware. What things are rationally connected to preserving high stand-
ards in the bar seems to be as varied as committees and judges conceive them to be.
In one case, a man who had practiced law in another state applied for bar admis-
sion in Arizona. During investigations by the character committee, testimony was re-
ceived that he had been guilty of soliciting clients in his previous practice. Such
solicitation is a violation of Canon 27 of the Code of Professional Ethics and grounds
for disbarment. Upon appeal from an adverse ruling by the committee, the Supreme
Court of Arizona acknowledged the impossibility of resolving the conflicting testimony
but admitted petitioner on other evidence of his good character. 49 Other courts have
been less willing to look beyond the recommendations of character committees, espe-
cially when the applicant has been charged with crimes involving moral turpitude.5 0
The court may ignore other evidence of good moral character and accept recom-
mendations of the committee "unless there is a strong showing of abuse of discretion,
arbitrary action, fraud, corruption or oppression upon the part of the examiners." s
Clearly the courts may exercise a large amount of discretion in cases involving con-
duct deemed immoral.
The Supreme Court in Schware, citing the brief for respondent, posited that "[m]ere
unorthodoxy [in the field of political and social ideas] does not . . . negative 'good
moral character.' "52 There is, therefore, more justification for independent judgments
by the courts where mere beliefs are questioned by committees. In Florida Bar v.
Wilkes53 the Supreme Court of Florida was asked to uphold a state law which made
disbarment in another state conclusive proof of the guilt of the acts of misconduct
adjudicated there. It accepted the statute, but refused to disbar the petitioner merely
on a general complaint of foreign disciplinary action.5 4 Reviewing de novo the evidence
gathered by the committee, it could find nothing more incriminating than belief in
existentialist philosophy. This, it made clear, would not suffice for disbarment in
Florida.
As suggested, not every case falls easily into a definitional scheme. In re Brooks5s
considered the case of a petitioner who, because of strong religious beliefs could not
"morally" cooperate in the war effort. After forthrightly registering as a conscientious
48. In re Courtney, 83 Ariz. 231, 319 P.2d 991 (1957).
49. Ibid.
50. In re Monaghan, 122 Vt. 199, 167 A.2d 81 (1961).
51. Id. at 205, 167 A.2d at 86.
52. 353 U.S. 232, 244 (1957).
53. 179 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 983 (1968).
54. Id. at 201.
55. 57 Wash. 2d 66, 355 P.2d 840(1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 813 (1961).
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objector he refused to report to a wartime work camp because of his religious beliefs.
After serving 22 months of a three year sentence, he applied for membership in the
bar. His application was denied by the committee. On appeal, the court affirmed the
refusal on the basis of his record. It is difficult to justify this holding in light of the
Schware caveat that mere beliefs will not negate good moral character.
First Amendment Limits
The Law Students case is significant in that it establishes clear standards in the admis-
sion process in New York with respect to first amendment guarantees. There has been
a long line of cases in the Supreme Court which has given the right of free speech and
association a preferred position in our constitutional system.56 Law Students is the first
case to apply these protections to the bar admission process. After careful scrutiny of
each question in the questionnaire distributed by the committee, the court struck down
those not "in line with developing concepts of First Amendment rights."57
The court indicated that several questions which were dropped by the committee
before commencement of the suit would not have survived a first amendment attack 58
These questions required extensive listings of associational ties by the applicant, in a
manner held unconstitutional in two recent Supreme Court decisions.59 The court then
discussed three questions which were presently in the questionnaire, and found fault
with all three.
Question 27(b),60 a pledge of loyalty to the Constitution, was sustained as identical
to the pledge previously upheld in a prior New York case involving school teachers.
61
The court also pointed out that supporting the principles of the Constitution is basic
to our form of government and is a valid concern of the courts. 62 The phrase "without
mental reservation" does not significantly change the import of the New York question.
56. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
57. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, Civil No. 68-2917
at 19 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 1969).
58. For example, question 29(a) required that an applicant "[glive the names, ad-
dresses, objects of and period of membership in each and every club, association, society
or organization of which you are or have been a member other than those associated
with and recognized by accredited schools and colleges."
59. In the earlier of the two cases, the Court invalidated an Arkansas statute con-
cerned with teachers which contained a question similar to 29(a), because its require-
ment to list, without limit, every conceivable kind of associational tie, whether social,
professional, political, avocational, or religious is prohibited by the first amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech, assembly and petition. The relationships revealed by
such listings, they said, "could have no possible bearing upon the teacher's occupational
competence or fitness." (Emphasis added.) Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
In the latest case on this point, the Court referred to the "associational freedom" pro-
tected in Shelton and added that these rights "create a preserve where the views of the
individual are made inviolate." Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968).
60. "Can you conscientiously, and do you, affirm that you are, without any mental
reservation, loyal to and ready to support the Constitution of the United States?"
61. Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), af'd (per
curiam), 390 U.S. 36 (1968).
62. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, Civil No. 68-2917
at 20 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 1969).
1969]
Catholic University Law Review
The court did, however, object to the vagueness of question 27(a). 63 A promise to sup-
port a constitutional system already given, the questioning of belief in the "principles
underlying the form of government of the United States of America" 64 might reason-
ably be interpreted by an applicant as requiring belief in something more than the
essentials--"democratic government and change by lawful methods." 65 An applicant,
for example, might not feel he could answer the question affirmatively if he did not
believe in the electoral college or a bicameral legislature. 6 6 For this reason, the court
held that the question shared the defect of the oath in Whitehill v. Elkins6 7 which was
held to be so vague "as to make men of common intelligence speculate at their peril on
its meaning."' 6 8
The court turned next to the problem of overbreadth in question 26.69 Not finding
the scope of the inquiry so broad as that objected to in Shelton, the court found the
question defective in two other respects. First it was objected that the use of parenthet-
ical past-tense verbs gives the impression that membership in an organization which
at any time advocated the violent overthrow of the government is questionable. This
kind of overbreadth, the court held, yields the "chilling effects" objected to in Key-
ishian v. Board o1 Regents.7 0 An organization may change leadership, goals and means
by which its goals are sought. It is obvious that only memberships coincidental with
advocacy of illegal goals or methods can be questioned. Unfortunately, the question, as
written, does not make this distinction clear. Question 26 was also challenged on the
authority of Sweezy v. New Hampshire7 1 which held, in effect, that only knowing mem-
bership in an illegal organization is objectionable absent a compelling state interest. If
a person is a member of a group for legitimate reasons and is unmindful of its avowed
purposes, such membership cannot, constitutionally, be held against him. A question
void of this "scienter" notion, as is this one, is unacceptable.
63. "Do you believe in the principles underlying the form of government of the
United States of America?"
64. Ibid.
65. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, Civil No. 68-2917
at 21 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 1969).
66. Ibid.
67. 389 U.S. 54 (1967).
68. Id. at 59.
69. "Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a member of or par-
ticipated in any way whatsoever in the activities of any organization or group of persons
which teaches (or taught) or advocates (or advocated) that the Government of the
United States or any State or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown or
overturned by force, violence or any unlawful means?
If your answer is in the affirmative, state the facts below."
70. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). In this case the Court examined the Feinberg Law of
New York as it applied to state teachers. The law required a test of loyalty as a con-
dition to employment in the state school system. The Court noted the "stifling effect on
the academic mind from curtailing freedom of association" in a manner which does not
account for the specific intent of the subject, but merely finds a type of guilt by
association. This stifling effect arises "since those covered by the statute are bound to
limit their behavior to that which is unquestionably safe." Id. at 607, 609.
71. 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.). See also
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
[Vol. XVIII
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Finally question 3172 was struck because of its in terrorem effect on the right to free
association, especially in light of the directions at the head of the application: "1. This
is a statement made under oath. Applicant's failure fully and accurately to disclose any
fact or information called for by any question may result in the denial of the applica-
tion for admission, or ... in the revocation of his license to practice law." 73 The court,
referring to a test derived from Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy,
could find no compelling state interest sufficient to justify such extensive listing of
associational ties as required by question 3 1. It emphasized the absolute necessity of
specificity in questions which touch upon first amendment freedoms.
It is easy to see the possible effect that such a scheme of questions and oaths might
have on a prospective lawyer. He knows the kind of inquiries he will be expected to
answer, but is not sure which of the groups he may wish to join would be objectionable
to the committee. Many law students today are involved in civil rights, politics and
other student movements. Much valuable work being done by these students might be
jeopardized if searching inquiries deterred students from joining these groups because
of a fear of possible sanctions from the bar. Law Students is a recognition of this possi-
oility and a judicial warning against it.
A final issue, neither totally ignored nor completely met, was raised about the oral
interviews which usually accompany written screening. The plaintiffs contended that,
"the scope of this questioning is sometimes so broad as to constitute an unwarranted
invasion into the applicant's personal and political privacy." 74 The court answered that
there was no reason to assume that, "as the scope of the committees' written inquiry is
contracted, there will not be a similar adjustment in the focus of their spoken ques-
tions."75 Hopefully, the court is not being too optimistic. If the scope of the oral inter-
views is not adjusted, there may be different grounds for attacking this practice based
on the right of privacy. The issue put on these grounds would resolve itself almost
totally to the question of relevance which should be handled by trial-type procedures.
Conclusion
Law Students is a partial victory in New York76 for those who have objected to present
72. "Is there any incident in your life not called for by the foregoing questions which
has any favorable or detrimental bearing on your character or fitness? If the answer is
'Yes' state the facts."
73. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, Civil No. 68-2917
at 25 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 1969).
74. Id. at 26.
75. Ibid.
76. The defendants argued that the constitutional court provided in the United
States Code is only applicable to state-wide issues, as a judge made exception to Section
2281, see Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967); Currie, The Three-Judge District
Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHm. L. REV. 1, 31-34, 55 (1964). They based
their theory on the fact that questionnaires from only two of the four judicial depart-
ments were in direct issue in the complaint made by the plaintiffs. The court found no
merit in this argument citing, inter alia, "the effect of admission or denial is state-wide;
admission in one department is the key to lawful practice throughout the State." Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, Civil No. 68-2917 at 17
(S.D.N.Y., Feb. 17, 1969).
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admission processes. The effect of this holding can only be hypothesized in light of the
prestige of the District Court of the Southern District of New York and the soundness
of the court's reasoning. Although the court refused to shift the burden of proof from
the applicant to the bar on the question of worthiness, it did severely limit the means
used to elicit such proof. This case heralds the application in New York, and predict-
ably in other states with similar procedures, of the first amendment protections to
those who wish to practice law.
Refusal to invalidate the statutes involved here is a judicial affirmance of the need
for continued careful scrutiny of prospective attorneys. Rather than shifting the burden
of proof from the applicant, the court here preferred to more closely supervise the
methods used by the bar for determining whether this burden has been met. The
general effect of this case will be to make bar procedures less susceptible to arbitrari-
ness and discrimination. It will not, however, significantly alter the right of state bars
to require high standards of character and to require proof of this by the applicant.
The claimed "chilling effect" which the statutory requirement itself may produce in
the law student should be warmed by this court's policing of admission techniques.
Alice in Wunderlich: The Attorney General's Dream of
Limiting the GAO's Claim Settlement Authority
The present controversy over the authority of the General Accounting Office (GAO)
to review contract appeals board decisions arose out of a contract between the Air
Force and Southside Plumbing Company, Inc. The contract contained the standard
"disputes clause" which provides that if a dispute arises under the contract, the con-
tractor can request a decision by the contracting officer.1 This decision is final unless
appealed within 30 days to the department head or his duly authorized representative
-in the instant case, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA).2 The
decision of the appeals board on questions of fact is "final and conclusive unless deter-
mined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or
arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by
substantial evidence."
3
Southside claimed additional compensation for work which it asserted was outside
the scope of the contract and therefore not covered by the basic price. Both the con-
tracting officer and the ASBCA denied the claim. 4 Rather than appealing to the
1. 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (1968). The contracting officer is the person who executes
the contract on behalf of the government. Id. § 7.103-1 (b).
2. Id. § 30.1 (1968).
3. Id. § 7.103-12 (1968).
4. Southside Plumbing Co., 1963 GOVT CONT. REP. 1 3982 (ASBCA); 1964 Gov'T
CONT. REP. 4314 (ASBCA).
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